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7Introduction and summary 
1. Relevance of the research theme 
In the later decades many European countries including Norway have been experiencing a 
considerable increase in life expectancy accompanied with a tendency for earlier withdrawal 
from the labour force.  In addition to these long term effects, the cohorts of baby boomers are 
approaching the retirement age.  In these circumstances, the financial stability of the social 
security systems based on the defined benefit principle and where pensions are financed 
through the social tax on the earnings of the current employees (PAYGO or PAY-AS-YOU-
GO), is exposed to a considerable and growing financial threat.  Recent forecasts suggest that 
in the absence of major change in the National Insurance System in Norway (NIS) the 
expenditure on old age pension will increase from 6 to about 15 percent of mainland 
Norwegian GDP before year 2050 (Summary of Report to Storting Nr. 12, 2005) with the 
consequent increase of the tax burden. 
To counteract these effects and to increase the stability of the social security systems, the 
governments are forced to undertake certain policy reforms which are many times of a rather 
large scale (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003).  In Norway, the work on the pension reform has 
started in 2001 when the Pension Commission was appointed to evaluate the prospects of the 
NIS.  The commission reported in (Nou 2004:1, 2004) that the system is in fact incapable to 
cope with the growing threats and suggested some policy measures.  The retirement age in 
Norway is already relatively high, but the existence of other exit routes significantly lowers 
the labour force supply among the older workers.  The generous access to the disability 
pension makes it a second major type of retirement, which accounts for about 30% of the 
active labour force before the earliest old age retirement is feasible (Røed and Haugen, 
2003)a.  In addition, the introduction of the Norwegian early retirement program (AFP) in 
1989 has also contributed to the reduction of the labour force participation because the system 
provides strong economic incentives to stop working when the AFP retirement option is 
available (Bratberg, Holmas et al., 2004). 
a The importance of health conditions for the time of retirement is also shown in other countries Bound and 
Waidmann (1992). 
8Hence, in order to induce higher labour force participation the policy measures have to be 
designed as to affect a whole complicated family of institutional restrictions and economic 
incentives that influence the retirement decisions made by the individuals.  Typically, such 
policies have never been in affect before, which makes it hard to assess their behavioural 
consequences.  Therefore structural modelling as opposed to the reduced form approaches 
becomes an ultimate tool for the job of predicting and comparing the implications and the 
outcomes of the social security reforms. 
An additional argument in favour of the topic of the dissertation is the increasing scientific 
output in this area which can be seen in the literature. 
2. The objectives of the research 
The main objective of the dissertation is establishing a structural dynamic model of the 
retirement behaviour which would be on one hand complicated enough to incorporate 
heterogeneity among the decision makers with respect to their health, labour market position, 
income levels and some personal and family characteristics, and to carefully replicate the 
existing Norwegian institutional settings influencing the retirement process.  On the other 
hand the model would still have to be computationally tractable.  Application of the 
developed model to the real life policy design through simulations of the consequences of 
potential policy changes is another objective of this dissertation. 
All three papers included into the dissertation contribute to these objectives.  The first paper 
constructs the dynamic structural model of health and retirement which meets the specified 
criteria, develops an estimation strategy and proceed with the estimation.  In addition, the 
applied question of potential substitution of the early retirees into the disability system is 
investigated.  The second paper is devoted to measuring the goodness of fit in the class of 
structural dynamic models similar to the one established in the first paper, in particular with 
the help of exogenous policy change.  The paper gives a foundation for the use of the model 
in the real life applications.  Finally, the third paper applies the developed model for the 
forecasting of the behavioural and economic implications of the pension reform which is 
currently under discussion and development in Norway.  
3. Literature review of the field 
The existing literature on retirement behaviour and policy analysis is generally in consensus 
about the important role of health in the retirement process.  Many of the retirement studies 
9which have established a strong influence of the economic incentives to the retirement 
decision neglect the health effects, although do acknowledge the need to take them into 
account (Gordon and Blinder, 1980; Blau, 1994; Hernæs, Sollie et al., 2000; Borsch-Supan 
and Schmidt, 2000; Hernæs and Strom, 2000; Powers, Neumark et al., 2001; Krueger, Meyer 
et al., 2002; Chan, Stevens et al., 2003; Conti, Berndt et al., 2006).  (Bloom, Canning et al., 
2004) shows in a theoretical model how dropping out of labour market may be induced by 
worsening health.  (Bound, 1998) takes this approach to the data and finds empirical evidence 
of health effects which are especially strong when measured on the relative rather than 
absolute scale.  (Bound, Schoenbaum et al., 1995, 1996) show that controlling for health in a 
static model accounts for most of the racial gap in the labour force attachment and disability 
status of older American men and women in the 1990s.  (Disney, Emmerson et al., 2006) use 
British household panel survey (1991-1998) to find that both current and lagged health shocks 
are positively correlated with a decision to drop out of labour force.  (Au, Crossley et al., 
2005) also find evidence of the influence of health on the retirement behaviour when they use 
Canadian data.  After (Henretta, 1983; Hurd, 1989; Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992a; 
Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992b; Blau, 1997) showed the influence of a spouse to the 
individual retirement decision and the household approach was widely taken into the 
retirement researchb, (Coile, 2004) examines the “added worker effect” which suggests an 
increase of labour force participation of an individual after a negative health shock to the 
spouse.  (Olson, 1998) studies American households and shows that wives without spousal 
health benefits are more likely to work full-time than those who are covered by the spousal 
health insurance.  Health insurance is also shown by (Rogowski and Karoly, 2000) to be 
important for the retirement decisions, in particular, access to post-retirement health insurance 
has a large effect on retirementc.
Once the significance of the health status on the retirement behaviour has been recognized, 
the issue of establishing a plausible and practical model that is capable of providing reliable 
simulations of the key policy measures becomes a major concern.  (Gruber, 2000) studies the 
elasticity of labour force participation with respect to disability benefit generosity using a 
difference-in-difference approach and finds sizable labour supply response to possible 
b See, for example, Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), Vermeulen (2002), Coile (2003), Jia (2003), Gustman and 
Steinmeier (2004), Hernæs, Jia and Strøm (2006). 
c For the survey of the literature on the effects of health insurance see Gruber and Madrian (2002). 
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changes in disability benefits.  Studies based on the reduced from models, however, can not 
be applied to simulate the effects of central policy reforms.  Therefore structural models have 
been widely used in the retirement studies within different frameworks: static discrete choice 
(Dagsvik and Strøm, 1997; Dagsvik, 2002; Bratberg, Holmas et al., 2004; Dagsvik and Strøm, 
2006; Dagsvik and Jia, 2006), quasi-dynamic approach (Jia, 2000; Hernæs and Strom, 2001; 
Iskhakov, 2003), lifecycle approach (French, 1999; Gustman, Steinmeier et al., 2004a, 2004b; 
Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005) and other (Hurd, 1989; Blau, 1997; Michaud and Vermeulen, 
2004).
However, the occurrences of structural modelling of disability are quite rare in the existing 
literature.  This is mainly because of the mentioned difficulty of modelling eligibility for 
disability pension which could in principle be overcome if reliable and transparent measures 
of health were available.  Unfortunately, absence of essential data makes it impossible to 
incorporate the process of health screening into the structural model.  Moreover, not only 
health data is hardly reliable and seldom available, but it also bears internal inconsistencies 
which are given a lot of attention in the literature. 
Health can be measured in many different ways.  The first and the most straightforward way 
is to ask respondents health-related questions in a survey and to use the answers for 
constructing either multidimensional or scalar measures usually on a simple ordinal scale 
(Bound, Schoenbaum et al., 1996; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999; Kreider and Riphahn, 2000; 
McGarry, 2002; Heiss, Hurd et al., 2003).  These measures may suffer from 
multidimensionality and incomparability, scale simplicity (Allison and Foster, 2004) and 
other problems, but most of all they may suffer from endogeneity concerns described, for 
example, in (Bound, 1991).  Together with other authors they raise the suspicion that 
answering questions about health status the respondents, especially those unemployed, may 
be rationalizing their labour market state or work preferences, which leads to overestimation 
of the influence of health in comparison with economic factors (known as “justification 
bias”).  This suspicion is to some extent neutralized when the survey questions are less direct 
and address simple activities of daily living (ADL)d – health measures based on such 
questions are considered more “objective” (Heiss, Hurd et al., 2003; Coile, 2004).  Another 
possibility to eliminate the justification bias comes from introducing additional explanatory 
d “Do you have problems walking up the stairs?” rather then “Is your health limiting your ability to work?” 
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variables to instrument health.  As pointed out by (Bound, 1991) in some circumstances, this 
gives even worse results, and therefore health indexes incorporating both subjective and 
objective information (possibly in different proportions) together with some individual 
characteristics may serve as “best” health measure (Bound, 1998; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999).  
(Disney, Emmerson et al., 2006) call a version of such index a “health stock” and use it as one 
of the explanatory variables in a bigger labour market behaviour model.  The most serious 
drawback of a health index approach is its failure to provide a general theory of index 
construction – health indexes are task and project specific.  Further, (Kreider, 1999) uncovers 
deeply imbedded inconsistency of health measurement which follows from the fact that health 
in medical sense is very different from work limitation measures important for labour market 
studies.  The two concepts are very much related but when measurement is not perfect, the 
implied errors may be large.  This is especially vivid when the health indexes are aimed at 
specific applications.  Thus, for example, body mass index (BMI) or health utility index mark 
3 (HUI3) used in the labour market analysis in (Rogowski and Karoly, 2000; Au, Crossley et 
al., 2005) seem mostly medically oriented while (Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky et al., 2004) give 
an excellent example of constructing a health index that outperforms the procedure used by 
Social Security Administration in the US for evaluating the disability applications.  The last 
index is based on both the subjective measures (health related questions) and objective 
measures (ADL questions and individual characteristics) and is optimized for a narrow job.  It 
is possible to come up with yet more “objective” measures for health as, for example, 
diagnosis (Gjesdal and Bratberg, 2003) or utilization of medical services (Currie, Gruber et 
al., 1995).  While the latter measure is definitely more appropriate for medical rather than 
labour market study, the former is used in a simplified form when health is measured by 
different health related events as stroke, cancer diagnosed, etc. (Heiss, Hurd et al., 2003; 
Coile, 2004).  Finally, mortality appears as the most objective but too aggregate measure of 
health and is therefore not used very often in microeconomic research (McGarry, 2002; Autor 
and Duggan, 2006).  In the same time, self-assessed life expectancy is shown to be well-
behaved measure (Hurd and McGarry, 2002) which also can be used in labour economic 
research (Coile, 2004). 
Most of the different approaches for measuring health listed above originate in the 
corresponding survey questions.  When instead it is a register data collected by the authorities 
which is used for estimation, the choice of health measures is very much reduced.  The only 
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available from the above options are mortality rates, medical services utilization and medical 
records.  When neither of these is suitable or available, sick leave data from the employer 
registers may be the only option to serve as a health proxy in spite of unclear biases it may 
have in measuring work limitations (Gjesdal and Bratberg, 2003)e.
The described controversies about the health measures are only magnified when it comes to 
modelling health dynamics.  Increasing data requirements and multiplied measurement errors 
limit the available options and force the researches to simplify health related aspects of the 
models up to their complete elimination as in (Jia, 2005).  (Bound, 1998; Au, Crossley et al., 
2005; Disney, Emmerson et al., 2006) reflect the dynamic aspects of health by using lagged 
health measures among the current period explanatory variables.  (Gustman, Steinmeier et al., 
2002; Heyma, 2004) estimate complicated structural dynamic models but don’t include health 
into the set of stationary variables and use health measures as exogenous.  When health is 
allowed to vary over time, the movements may be very much limited with the restrictions not 
necessarily implied by the theoretical setup but rather by the tractability considerations 
(Berkovec and Stern, 1991; Heiss, Hurd et al., 2003).  In those rare occasions when health is 
true endogenous state variable, it is usually measured on a simple dichotomous scale and is 
assumed to follow a Markovian motion rule (Rust and Phelan, 1997; French, 1999). 
4. Theoretical and methodological foundation of the research 
The model of the retirement behaviour of the older workers is based on the assumption of 
rationality within the framework of the random utility.  The decision makers are assumed to 
be maximizing the expectation of the discounted lifetime utility induced by the decision at a 
particular time period.  These assumptions lead to a time consistent behaviour as shown by 
(Hammond, 1988) and facilitate the use of dynamic programming as the main methodological 
framework of the research.  The model is estimated using the algorithms similar to the nested 
fixed point algorithm by (Rust, 1994) which follows the tradition of structural stochastic 
dynamic programming originating in (Rust, 1987) and broadened for labour market analysis 
in (Rust, 1990; Rust and Phelan, 1997).  This framework rests on both the theory of stochastic 
control (Pontrjagin, 1962) and the econometrics of discrete choice (McFadden, 1974, 1981), 
especially in part when it coincides with the random utility approach as surveyed in (Dagsvik, 
e In Gjesdal and Bratberg (2003) the number of days on sick leave is shown to be a significant predictor of the 
disability condition with the overall pseudo-R2 in the model at about 30%. 
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2000).  More generally, this work is based on the calculus of variations, mathematical theory 
of stochastic processes and general theory of probabilities.  The estimation of the model is 
facilitated by the general methods of mathematical statistics, in particular the maximum 
likelihood method.  The general method is somewhat modified for the use with the latent state 
variables following the incomplete information approach of (Rhenius, 1974) and applies a 
multi step estimation approach (Rust, 1994; Greene, 2000). 
5. Scientific novelty of the dissertation 
Modelling of health process explicitly within the structural dynamic framework is the main 
scientific novelty of this dissertation.  Besides (Rust and Phelan, 1997) the only recent 
example of endogenous modelling of health dynamics is found in (Bound, Stinebrickner et al., 
2007) while the majority of the previous work within this methodology had to either 
completely drop the health status (Karlstrom, Palme et al., 2004; Jia, 2005) or significantly 
simplify it’s scale and motion (Berkovec and Stern, 1991; Gilleskie, 1998; Gustman, 
Steinmeier et al., 2002; Burkhauser, Butler et al., 2004; Heyma, 2004; French, 2005).  Unlike 
the previous research which has typically used self reported and indirect measures of 
disability conditions, I model health as a direct latent indicator of the eligibility to retire 
through the disability insurance system.  There are three values of health status: (Į) when 
health is good (no work limitations) the disability option is infeasible; (ȕ) the bad health adds 
this option to the choice set, but it may not necessarily be taken, thus enabling the bad health 
to be concealed; finally, (Ȗ) the very bad (worst) health narrows the choice set to a single 
option, namely forces an individuals to full time disability.  To moderate the discrepancy 
between the endogenous self reported and more objective health measures, (Bound, 1991; 
Bound, 1998) suggests modelling health as a latent variable using self reported disability 
status as an indicator for the latent construct.  Unavailability of the reliable instruments for 
disability conditions in the data forced me to treating the latent health as completely 
uncontrolled Markovian stochastic process.  Although this approach creates an unobservable 
state variable and results in a significant complication of the estimation procedure, it allows 
me to accurately model the disability exit in a structural dynamic framework and facilitates 
the crucial policy simulations. 
The developed structural dynamic model carefully replicates the Norwegian institutional 
settings and takes into account the potential substitution between the different retirement 
paths induced by the behavioural effects.  Using such a model for testing the effects of the 
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forthcoming pension reform in Norway is a novelty in itself.  So far the analysis of the 
pension reform (Stensnes, Texmon et al., 2007) was performed within the dynamic 
microeconomic simulation model (Fredriksen, 1995, 1998) which has been developed by 
Statistics Norway over the decades specifically for calculating long term projections of 
population, labour force, education and social security spending.  The forecasts produced by 
this model originate in the simulation of a series of social-economic events using certain 
transition probability distributions.  In other words, the behavioural response to the new 
policies is left out of the simulations.  To my knowledge, structural dynamic models of 
retirement have never been used before for the full scale simulations of the effects of the 
pension reforms. 
6. Practical significance of the research 
Structural dynamic model of health and retirement developed in this dissertation has high 
practical significance.  The successful estimation of the model performed in the first paper 
brings it to the ready state for practical usage which is immediately demonstrated.  The 
conclusions obtained in the first paper, namely, that only about 5-8% of otherwise early 
retirees would receive disability pension, and that most of these disability pensioners would 
retain a part time job until the usual retirement age, are very important for the practitioners in 
the governmental institutions designing a policy change that would induce, for example, later 
withdrawal from the labour market. 
The applied third paper in the dissertation demonstrates the power of the practical use of the 
dynamic structural modelling for the forecasting of behavioural implications of the new 
policies and policy changes.  The forthcoming in 2010 new pension regulations in Norway 
which are currently under discussion were imbedded into the model to facilitate the 
simulations of the behavioural response to the pension reform.  Because the model assesses 
all the important variables determining the economic situation of the individual agent, and 
therefore these primitives are predicted in the simulations, they are not only capable to reveal 
the labour market consequences of the reform, but also to forecast the changes in inequality 
and social welfare.  The developed model thus becomes an ultimate tool for the policy design 
and analysis of the policies never implemented before. 
It should be noted that the very latest wage negotiations which took place in March and April 
2008 clarified some of the aspects of the pension reform which were undecided when the third 
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paper was written.  Even though by the time of submission of the dissertation some of the 
assumptions made there appear to be inconsistent, the practical significance of the research 
remains undisputable. 
7. Summary of the papers 
The dissertation consists of three individual papers united by the same research theme and 
modelling approach.  The first paper develops the theoretical structure of the dynamic model 
of health and retirement, designs the estimation strategy, proceeds with the estimation and 
reports the estimation results.  The first paper also studies the substitution effects between 
early retirement and the disability pension as two main exit routs from the labour market in 
Norway.  The second paper systematizes the measure of quality of the structural dynamic 
models and suggests the use of the exogenous policy change for the thorough testing of the 
specification of the models and the structural estimates they produce.  The proposed methods 
are applied for the structural dynamic model developed in the first paper using as a policy 
change the reduction of the early retirement age in 1998 when a group of agents experienced a 
sudden change in their choice sets.  The third paper is devoted to the ongoing pension reform 
in Norway and simulates the behavioural response of the older workers retiring under the new 
pension regulations.  Both the labour market consequences as well as welfare and inequality 
are analysed.  Below I present short summaries for all three papers. 
Paper 1. Health and retirement in a structural dynamic setting 
Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of the substitution between the early 
retirement and disability as two major exit routes from the labour market in Norway.  The 
analysis is based on a dynamic structural model that addresses the interplay between health, 
institutional constraints and economic incentives of men and women in the later part of their 
working lives.  Unlike most of the previous work which has typically used self reported and 
indirect measures of disability conditions, I model health as a direct latent indicator of the 
eligibility to retire through the disability insurance system.  The model is specifically 
designed to account for the random occurrences of the disability conditions and their possible 
concealment by the individuals in favour of higher utility and broader choice sets in the 
future.  The model is estimated using Norwegian register data.  I investigate the substitution 
effect between the disability and early retirement exits by simulating a complete elimination 
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of the latter.  My findings suggest only moderate inflow of the otherwise early pensioners into 
the disability program. 
The first paper contains six sections including the introduction and the conclusions, which 
occupy 48 pages and which are followed by two appendices.  After the introduction which 
allocates the paper within the existing literature in the field, Section 2 is devoted to complete 
description of the model from the initial assumptions through the description of the sample 
data to the expression for the likelihood function.  Structural dynamic model of health and 
retirement is a finite horizon Markovian discrete stochastic control model in discrete time.  
Rationally behaving decision makers maximize the expected lifetime discounted utility 
( )0
0 0
( , ) max
T t
t T
t t T
t T T
E U d s sτ δ
τ
ρ β −
∈
= =
­ ½§ ·° °
+ Λ →¨ ¸® ¾
° °© ¹¯ ¿
¦ ∏
F
, (1)
where the vector ts S∈  taking values from the problem state space S  and the scalar 
1( , )t t t td D s d −∈  taking values from the choice sets 1( , )t t tD s d −  denote correspondingly state 
and decision variables, ( , )t tU d s  is instantaneous utility discounted with the discount factor 
β , and τρ  is sample specific exogenous survival probability from period 1τ −  to period τ .
The time index serves as indicator of age, 0 1 50T − =  and 70T = , after the age of 70 no 
transfers occur and no decisions are made.  Termination function ( )TsΛ   captures the 
remaining after the age of 70 lifetime utility.  Savings are assumed away which eliminates the 
budget constraint.  A solution to the individual sequential decision problem (1) is found 
among decision rules ( )0 ,...,T Tδ δ δ=  – which define a correspondence between a current state 
ts  and a chosen control ( )t t td sδ=  – from the class F  of feasible decision rules.  Feasibility 
conditions are expressed in a family of choice sets 1( , )t t tD s d −  that contain the available to the 
agent options at period t.  The expectation in (1) is taken with respect to the set of subjective 
transition probabilities { }
0
1 1 { ,.., }
( | , )t t t t T Tp s s d− − ∈  that govern stochastic process { },t td s δ  induced 
by the given decision rule δ ∈F .
The state vector ( , , , , , , , , )t t t t t t t ts gender afpage ps h m e sp nw aw=  is populated with the 
exogenous gender and the potential early retirement age, previous labour market state tps
(the model distinguishes between 8 labour market states: out of labour market (OLM), full 
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time early or regular pension, full time disability, unemployment (including partial 
unemployment), employment in non-AFP company, partial employment in non-AFP 
company combined with partial disability, employment in AFP company and partial 
employment in AFP company combined with partial disability), health status {0,1, 2}th ∈  of 
an individual directly defined in the model as eligibility for the disability pension, the job 
match variable {0,1, 2}tm ∈  which indicates whether no job, AFP or non-AFP job is available 
for an individual in the given period, the individual AFP eligibility indicator {0,1}te ∈  which 
govern whether an individual AFP conditions are satisfied, spouse existing indicator 
{0,1}tsp ∈ ,and two income indices tnw  and taw .
After these state variables determining the choice set 1( , )t t tD s d −  are realized in the beginning 
of each period, the agent makes a decision 1( , )t t t td D s d −∈  which can be interpreted as a 
reaction to the evolving environment 
0{ ,.., }
{ , , , }t t t t t T Tps h m e ∈ .  Decision variable marks different 
combinations of the answers to the question whether to remain on the labour market and 
whether to apply for a pension.  Taken decision determines the current period labour market 
state, and the two income related state variables are realized, namely the average wage 
taw +∈\  which represents individual lifetime trend in the wage earnings, and the number of 
last consecutive years with wages over the basic pension amount {0,1...10}tnw ∈  which 
represents recent dynamics in the wage earnings. 
Following (Rust, 1994) the utility function ( , )t tU d s  is assumed to contain an additivity 
separable random component which elements are distributed independently with the extreme 
value distribution, so that the choice probabilities take the form 
{ }
{ }
1( , )
exp ( , )
( | )
exp ( , )
t t
t t t
t t t
t t
d D s d
v d s
P d s
v d s
−
′∈
=
′¦
, (2)
expressed through the value function 
( )
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Given the panel of observations { }
0{ 1,.., }, {1,.., }
, , , , , a a
a a a a a a
t t t t t t t T T a A
d ps e sp nw aw
∈ − ∈
 which originates in 
the collection of the Norwegian register data files organized by the Statistics Norway and 
available at the Frisch Centre for Economic Research, and describe the sample of 200 921 
single and full households, the likelihood function based on the choice ( | )t t tP d s  and 
transition 1 1( | , )t t tp s s d− −  probabilities 
0 0
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1 ( , )
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a a
a a
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− −
− −
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( , , ) ( ) ( | )a a a a aT T T T Tp m h p h p m hθ− − − − −= ⋅ , ( ), , , , , ,a a a a a at t t t t t t ts ps h m e sp nw aw=
(4)
is constructed by aggregating the probability mass along all trajectories 
0 0
( , ) ( ,.., , ,.., )T T T Th m h h m m=  of the latent health and job match processes which are consistent 
with the available observations: ( , ) ah m HM∈ .  Probabilities 
0 0
0 1 1
( , , )a aT Tp m h θ− −  define the 
initial conditions. 
Section 3 of the paper describes the assumed dependence structure of the controlled 
Markovian transition probability for the state process { }1 1( | , )t t tp s s d− −  and reports the 
obtained estimates for the agents’ beliefs with respect to evolvement of all the state variable.  
In particular, health status th  and the job match tm  are modelled as simple Markov chains 
(jointly independent of the rest of the transitions) with uniform across individuals’ transition 
probability matrices, spouse existing probabilities 1( | )t tp sp sp −  are exogenous and sample 
specific.  When they are not verifiable from the rest of the state variables, the individual AFP 
eligibility conditions are predicted with two simple logit models responsible respectively for 
the eligibility status at the AFP age and on the later years.  The transition probability 
1( | , )t t tp aw ps aw −  distribution of the aggregated wage becomes degenerate after the estimated 
recursive expression (motion rule) is assumed deterministic due to its extremely tight fit.  The 
short term indicator of the income profile tnw  follows a simple dichotomous motion pattern 
described with a logit model. 
Section 4 describes the assumed structure of the agents’ preferences and reports the structural 
estimates of the discount factor (0.91235 with the standard error 0.0009) and the parameters 
in the likelihood function.  The deterministic part ( , )t tu d s  of the utility function ( , )t tU d s  has 
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the additive form with constant relative risk aversion λ  with respect to household disposable 
income (estimated at the level of 0.67393 with standard error 0.03001) and linear leisure.  
Other coefficients of the utility function are estimated asf
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
(0.00426)
(0.57728) (0.02073) (0.01838)
7
1
0
( ) 1
, , 0.17147
29.3224 1 0.26551 0.61363 female
.
t t
t t
k t
k
Tx I
u d s u I L
h sp L
c ps k
λ
λ
ξ ξ
ξ +
=
−
= = ⋅
ª º+ ⋅ = + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅« »¬ ¼
+ ⋅ =¦
(5)
With no reliable data leisure 1( , ) ( )t t tL L d s L ps += = , it is simplified to three constant levels 
which correspond to different labour market states.  In contrast, the incomes of the households 
are calculated in a complicated manner as a sum of at most four sources (earned income, 
pension, social security benefits and other additional incomes, income from a spouse) which 
come into play in the relevant states 1tps + .  The sources are predicted on the basis of all the 
state variables as reported in the Appendix for the first paper. 
Finally, Section 5 presents a practical application of the estimated model, namely the analysis 
of substitution between the disability and early retirement exit routes from the Norwegian 
labour market.  The question stated is “What fraction of the AFP pensioners would be able to 
retire with disability pension if the former option was not available?”  The performed 
simulation of a complete elimination of the early retirement system shows that between 
4.88% and 7.99% of otherwise early retirees end up with the disability benefit in the ages of 
64-66 years. 
The paper is finalized by a short conclusion and two appendices which describe the estimation 
strategy of the model and the technique used for predicting counterfactual household incomes 
respectively. 
Paper 2. Quality of structural dynamic models and unexpected policy change 
Abstract: This paper overviews the measures of goodness of fit of the structural dynamic 
models estimated on the labour market data, generalizes a popular McFadden’s rho coefficient 
for the use in the structural dynamic models of discrete choice and suggests a general 
f Indicator function ( )ξ <  returns unity if the condition is satisfied and zero otherwise, ( )Tx <  is a mapping from 
before tax household incomes to disposable household incomes. 
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framework for the testing of stability of the structural estimates based on the unexpected 
changes of the institutional settings.  Suggested approaches are applied for testing the quality 
of the dynamic model of health and retirement estimated in (Iskhakov, 2008).  The results 
indicate a reasonable fit of this model, but also reveal some restrictions in the application of 
the proposed quality measures. 
The second paper contains six sections including the introduction and the conclusions, which 
occupy 25 pages and which are followed by an appendix.  Preceded by the introduction which 
provides a short overview of the existing approaches used in judging the quality of structural 
dynamic models, Section 2 develops the generalization of the static McFadden’s goodness of 
fit rho coefficient for the dynamic models of discrete choice.  Generalization builds on the 
two common approaches for the formulation of the restricted benchmark specifications of the 
likelihood used in standard logit models which correspond to the direct approximation of the 
choice and transition probabilities in the structural dynamic case.  In standard notation, the 
frequency based and uniform approximations of the choice probabilities are given by 
{ }
{ }
( , ) : ,
( | )
( , ) :
a a a a
t t t tfreq
a a a
t t t
N d s d d s s
P d s
N d s s s
= =
=
=
, (6)
1( | )
( )
uniform
t t
t
P d s
D s
= , (7)
and similarly for the transition probabilities by 
{ }
{ }
1 1 1
1
:
( | , )
( , ) : ,
a a
t t tfreq
t t t a a a a
t t t t t t
N s s s
p s s d
N d s s s d d
+ + +
+
=
=
= =
, (8)
1
1( | , )uniform t t tp s s d S+
= , (9)
where { }N •  denotes the number of elements in the collection described by the properties in 
the brackets and •  denotes the number of elements in a set. 
Section 3 reports 9 proposed measures of goodness of fit calculated for different combinations 
of the used probability approximations.  The results range from modest 9.12% when only the 
choice probabilities are approximated to substantial 79.064% when both choice and transition 
21
probabilities are approximated with uniform distributions.  Most reasonable approximations 
lead to the fit coefficient 53.129% which reflects very reasonable fit of the model. 
Section 4 of the paper goes beyond the simple goodness of fit coefficients and systematizes 
four main approaches for testing dynamic models which include in-sample and out-of-sample 
predictive test as well as in-sample stability test and the test of stability across a policy 
change.  The last one is recognized as the ultimate procedure for assessment of the quality of 
structural dynamic models.  A version of this test applicable for the model estimated in the 
first paper is formulated in terms of unexpected change in the structure of future 
consequences of the made decisions.  Namely, a reduction in the early retirement age in 
Norway in 1997 and 1998 which happens during the period when the sample is observed, is 
used as an unexpected policy change.  Three cohorts (born in 1935-1937) were affected by 
this exogenous change and the behavioural response from these decision makers could be 
analyzed in the test on stability of the structural estimates on the model. 
In Section 5 I apply the described technique for the structural dynamic model of health and 
retirement.  Potential difficulties with identification of the transition probability parameters on 
the bases of largely reduced sample forces me to consider only the preference parameters in 
the test.  Large standard errors of the estimates of these parameters obtained for all considered 
simplifications of the utility function, however, indicate that the model fails to provide 
identification of the parameters using the data in the subsample.  Provided overview of the 
observed in this subsample transitions among the labour market states support this conclusion. 
The paper is finalized by a short conclusion and an appendix which contains a very short 
recapitulation of the structural dynamic model of health and retirement used in the illustrative 
examples. 
Paper 3. Pension reform in Norway: evidence from a structural dynamic model 
Abstract: This paper simulates a set of proposed policies from the Norwegian pension reform 
within a structural dynamic model of health and retirement estimated on the Norwegian 
labour market data.  The paper focuses on the two main elements of the reform, namely the 
new pension entitlement accrual rules linking benefits more closely to earnings and the new 
pension benefit drawing rules designed to eliminate the incentives distortions with respect to 
the time of retirement.  The effects of these proposals are investigated in terms of labour 
market outcomes, social welfare and income distribution.  It is shown that while the proposed 
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pension reform succeeds in urging the older workers to postpone their retirement and induces 
an increase in total social welfare, individuals in good health who retire early experience a 
negative change in their discounted utility.  In addition, an increase in social welfare is 
accompanied with an increase in income inequality. 
The third paper contains five sections including the introduction and the conclusions which 
altogether occupy 65 pages.  The introduction states the forthcoming difficulties in the 
financial stability of the social security systems of the Pay-As-You-Go type which are rather 
urgent for many OECD countries, provides a short description of the pension reform 
discussion taking place in Norway, and explains the advantages of using a structural dynamic 
approach for simulating the consequences of the reform measures. 
Section 2 of the paper consists of three sub-sections which consequently describe the main 
events and the documents of the Norwegian pension reform, the existing retirement settings in 
Norway and the main elements of the proposed new pension system.  The chronicle of the 
pension reform can be followed through a sequence of White papers and reports (Nou 2004:1, 
2004; St.Meld. Nr. 12, 2004; Innst. S. Nr. 195, 2005; St.Meld. Nr. 5, 2007; Innst. S. Nr. 168, 
2007) which gradually proceeds from agreeing on the general principles of the reform to the 
detailed rule and quantitative relations.  The most recent development in this discussion 
(Rapport Fra Afp-Utvalget, 2008) from the April of 2008 was publicized after the paper was 
completed and has thus not been included. 
The current Norwegian pension system belongs to the class of defined benefit pay-as-you-go 
systems.  The calculation of the pension benefit is based on so called pension points tpp
which are derived annually from the individual pension providing income with a concave 
piecewise linear function, and the basic amount G  which is corrected on annual bases in 
accordance to macroeconomic indicators.  If T denotes the length of individual working 
history, the annual pension benefit PB  is given by the formulas 
max(0.7933 , )PB G G SP= + ⋅ , (10)
( )
min( ,40)
1 2
1
, ,.., 40
T
t
T
t
SPrSP fpp pp pp pp G
=
= ⋅ ⋅ ¦ , (11)
( )
20
1 2
1, ,.., min( , 20) bestT tt T
fpp pp pp pp ppT
∈
= ¦ , (12)
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where the rate tSPr  was lowered from 0.45 to 0.42 in 1991 and 
20bestT  denotes the years in 
which the highest 20 pension points were earned.  The early retirement (AFP) scheme which 
is available for the individuals meeting the eligibility criteria and working at the participating 
companies, provides an option to retire earlier with the annual pension benefit practically 
equal to normal pension.  In addition, private occupational pension schemes play an important 
role in the retirement process in Norway. 
Section 2.3 which presents the proposed pension reform measures starts with a classification 
of the general principles of the reform into two dimensions – those aimed at making the 
system more direct thus freeing the retirement decision from the incentives distortions, and 
those aimed at making the system just and more redistributive.  All the proposed reform 
measures are then placed in the space determined by these dimensions, while the existing 
pension system is shown not to comply them at all.  The latter is explained with three major 
distortions implied by the limited number of years of pension rights accrual, concavity of the 
relationship between the income and the earned pension points, and the use of only the 
highest earning years in the pension calculation.  Among the proposed pension reform 
measures I consider four different accrual models which are for convenience expressed as 
functions of the average lifetime wage earnings.  Analysis of the marginal accrual rates 
reveals the evolution of these models towards the distortion free setting.  The notion of 
actuarial adjustment is shown to be a dual mechanism dealing simultaneously with the 
reduction of the pension benefit for the longer living cohorts and the increase of the benefit 
for the individuals choosing to stay in the labour force longer and to retire later than usual.  
Other quantitatively less important measures of the proposed reform are overviewed in the 
end of the section. 
Section 3 of the paper provides a short summary of the structural model of health and 
retirement developed and estimated in the first paper, focusing in details on the representation 
of the pension reform proposals in the restricted terms of the model.  The analysis of the 
fundamental assumptions of the following simulation, the exogenous information and the 
parameters which are assumed to be invariant throughout the pension reform, and the 
structure of the model lead to the narrowing of the set of the reform measures tested in the 
simulation to only the most important, namely new accrual models and new models for 
drawing of old age pension.  Yet, introducing these two elements into the model requires 
certain adjustments which are described in the rest of the section.  Different pension accrual 
24
rules are incorporated into the equations for pension income predictions used in the model 
with the means of a correction coefficient, which is in turn predicted on the bases of the 
benefit level under the old rules, gender, spouse existing indicator and the aggregated wage.  
Different options open for a decision maker in terms of drawing pension are adjusted for the 
Markovian nature of the model so that instead of the conditioning the benefit level on the age 
of retirement (as proposed in the reform), the agents face adjusted pension profiles in which 
the pension levels only depend on the state variables from the previous year.  Although the 
constructed pension profile suffers from being somewhat artificial, the main principle of 
actuarial adjustment, namely the equality of the net present values of the benefit streams 
independent of the time of retirement, is satisfied.  Special assumptions had to be made about 
the new early retirement rules which were not yet settled when the paper was completed.  
These assumptions, however, differ very little from what was agreed upon in April 2008 as 
described in (Rapport Fra Afp-Utvalget, 2008). 
Section 4 of the paper describes the results of the simulations of the Norwegian pension 
reform with respect to the labour market consequences, social welfare and income inequality.  
To set a common framework, 7 simulations sets combining different accrual and drawing 
settings are defined in the beginning of the section.  Section 4.1 reviews the labour market 
implications and reports in a substantial increase in the supply of labour between 62 an 69 
accompanied with significant decrease of the number of pensioners in most simulation sets.  
Differences in responses among the accrual models constitute the small scale adjustments 
while the large scale effects (up to 23 percent points increase in employment) is due to the 
new pension drawing rules.  Implications for the social welfare and income inequality are 
described in Section 4.2.  I use a simple welfare measure, namely the expected maximum 
level of the current utility where the maximization is performed over the available choices and 
the expectation is taken over the stochastic component of the utility.  The results indicate a 
significant increase in welfare in all the simulation sets except the first one when the AFP 
pension is left unchanged.  Differences among the accrual models are again responsible only 
for the second order effects.  Measured with a decile range in income distribution the income 
inequality is shown to increase quite a lot as a result of the pension reform with the magnitude 
also growing in time in all simulation sets.  Section 4.2 also contains a short individual 
analysis of the welfare implications which shows that those who lose welfare in the course of 
the reform do so mainly because of involuntary retirement due to job loss while those who 
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experience most increase in welfare are healthy individuals continuing to work after the 
normal retirement age. 
The paper is finalized with a short conclusion emphasizing the main implications of the 
reform, namely the desirable labour market outcome, positive welfare and income inequality 
effects, certain demand for the early retirement among some individuals and the absence of 
the long run dynamic behavioural reaction to the reform. 
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